disposal of the qaimmaqam. This latter detachment is not quartered in the serai, but occupies a similar, smaller building of its own a short distance up the road which serves as a barracks and a garage for the vehicles. However, the actual direction of the police has its place in the serai, because the qaimmaqam is its civilian director, and his assistant, the mamur (Arabic, "official"), an officer with the rank of lieutenant has an office there. These officers suffer somewhat in prestige because their rank was lower than that of many of the army officers of the neighborhood, and the army tends to look down on the police. During the summer of 1951, the mamur's adjutant, also an officer, was extremely unpopular with the townspeople for the familiar abuse of policemen in comedy, helping himself to refreshments and other small items at the expense of the merchants. The daily employment of the police in Rowanduz itself includes watching the market by day, providing guards for government buildings, transferring prisoners, and maintaining a patrol in the streets by night.

625
[647]
[554]
[661]
[578]

Perhaps there are no more favored objects of investment in the Middle East, no matter how great or how small the amount involved, than precious metal or land. To all classes of society these two are tangible objects of wealth, and of incredibly greater desirability than such things as bank-notes or bonds, for governments and bankers are highly variable, but soil or gold are always of value.

423
454

and another an old electric light bulb suspended from the ceiling by a string. 265 [353]

The maintenance of a chaykhana can be a fairly lucrative business, for it plays an important part in the social life of the lower classes. In the absence of any other entertainment, there is almost always a large number of persons in the chaykhanas, merchants, workmen, soldiers and policemen off duty, and loafers. The chaykhana, however, is definitely limited to the lower orders of society. One of the higher ranking officials, for example, the qaimaqam or the judge, would never be seen in such a place, nor would the army officers. The dividing line is to be found in the teachers, who sometimes visit in pairs or groups, but prefer the town "club" because it has none of the stigma attached to the tea-shop. The landed aristocrats, the chieftains, are not bound by the scruples of official or officer, but tend to avoid the places. The reason is clear and explicit. A man of the higher echelons of society is expected to maintain a diwankhana or guest-room in his home where he can entertain, and to be entertained in the houses of his friends, rather than purchase his refreshment in common with others. Similarly, a man of some standing in the community who spends much of his time in chaykhanas will quickly acquire the reputation of a loafer. Finally, as enlisted men from the army are to be found there on Fridays, there is talk that these places harbor homosexuals (hatiw baz, "homosexual," is a formidable term of abuse, an epithet which elicits knives.) 265 554 [517] [574] [558] [701] [578] [838]

diced and moulded about a metal skewer (kabab) or alter- 252
nated in whole pieces of flesh and fat upon the same 265
implement (tika). A charcoal fire is prepared in a [354]
rectangular metal brazier and brought to a bed of glowing
coals with a wicker fan. The skewers are placed over
this fire, and turned, with continuous fanning of the blaze,
until the meat is done. The grilled product is largely 265
sold by order to private homes, but some may be used in 437
the restaurant and still other offered to customers in a
chaykhana. As with the butcher, one must place a request
on the day preceding, for after noontime the kababchi has
often exhausted his supply of meat. The name of this [578]
occupation can be used in insult, and has much the same
meaning and strength as "chimney-sweep" in England of a
hundred years ago.

One of the most important items in the diet of the 256
townspeople is bread, and a huge quantity is baked daily, [262]
both by professionals and housewives. In addition to the
men who are bakers by profession, there are a number of
women who prepare a surplus beyond their needs at home
which is peddled about the town. The usual sales technique [443]
involves equipping the children of the house, either of [857]
baker or of housewife, with basketfuls and dispatching them
from shop to shop in the bazar and from house to house in
the town. The flour, purchased from merchants or mill- [415]
owners, is a coarsely-ground, greyish product, and, with
the addition of water, is kneaded into dough in a huge,
flat bottomed tub.

of ebony or some other wood inlaid with silver dots. The rosary may also be carried hanging loosely about the wrist.

The chieftains, and other townspeople of high station, carry pistols, almost always of the automatic type, in oilcloth holsters on the right or left hip, sometimes attached to the belt with a lanyard. The butt is often wrapped in a silk handkerchief, and this, together with the type of holster and the position in which it is worn, mitigates against the most efficient use, as in the case of the dagger. Bodyguards, as well as most of the populace, when fully armed, carry rifles and oilcloth bandoliers of ammunition, the latter hung crossed on the chest. The rifles are usually Iranian Army Mausers. British army weapons, such as the Webley revolver, are avoided because their possession is not easily explained to the authorities. It is difficult for Americans, in whose homes firearms are commonplace, to appreciate the apprehensiveness of government officers in an area of well-armed people such as this. In Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, as well as most of Iraq, the bulk of the agricultural population have comparatively few rifles among them and there is little threat of armed revolt in this quarter, save in the case of a few minority groups, such as the Druzes, who have maintained their integrity by precisely this means. The sale of arms and ammunition, except by almost impossible government formalities, is

517 824 574

...will offer a flower to a guest and the latter is expected to enjoy it for a short time by holding it to his nostrils before passing it to another. Young Kurdish dandies, not, however, in Rowanduz, hold flowers to their faces on the streets of Baghdad or Mosul to circumvent the smells of the metropolis. Perfume of any sort, probably because of its association with women, is abhorrent to Muslim puritans, of whom there are a few in the town, and they avoid it with violent gestures and condemnation. 302 562

Because the ablutions before prayers, with some reservation, apply to Muslims of both sexes, it is equally difficult to obtain an exact idea of the bathing habits of the townswomen. Unmarried girls are supposed to wash themselves completely twice or three times each week during the summer and once or twice each fortnight in colder weather. All of the hair of a woman's body must be removed: the pubic hair with a razor, that under the arms with the fingers, and the rest with a depilatory concocted of sugar and gum arabic. In addition, the ankles and feet are rubbed with a small piece of black stone. Both men and women clean the teeth with their fingers, pieces of rag, or European toothbrushes. The hair of a woman's head, on the other hand, is almost never cut or trimmed, and its length and richness are thought to be outstanding attributes of feminine beauty. Whenever two women quarrel, one often cries out "your hair will be cut," a promise of great catastrophe for her opponent. 515 302 [505] [826] [578]

considerable social intercourse between the two groups. 186
Unfortunately, the Nestorians, unable to find land in Iraq, 563
took service with the British, particularly in the infantry 571
levy battalions, and had a part, among other things, in
crushing two Kurdish revolts. There are many of them settled
in the Rowandus area, at Batas, Dara Harir and Dyana, and,
while outwardly amicable, the Kurds feel toward them a
certain amount of distrust and, in view of their alliance
with the British, especially in the lucrative occupations
of the Iraq Petroleum Company, jealousy. For their part, [567]
the Nestorians live in fear of massacre, and as many as
are able migrate abroad. The Christians of this native [582]
group are just as adamant in the matter of the marriage of
their daughters to Muslims as the Muslims are toward them.
One can find Muslims in Baghdad with American, British, or
German wives, but never Armenian or Chaldaean.

There is a curious sociological fact to be seen here. 627
Muslim girls who become prostitutes (in fact, any Muslim 837
woman whose reputation has been questioned) are in imminent 548
danger of being slain by their relatives, and the Baghdad
press is filled daily with such killings. Thus most of [553]
them assume Christian names, often of a cinema favorite,
and wear a cross conspicuously at the throat, changing
outwardly their religion to avoid detection. Islam 771
commands tremendous respect from its followers and is a 578
"proud" religion, one of warriors and conquerors. A
Muslim may be cursed by a non-Muslim to a certain point,

K 771 578

but must never be struck. For an "unbeliever" to use the curse in the name of religion, of which the full form is la'anatu Ilahi 'ala dinek, "the damnation of God on your faith," is an invitation to certain catastrophe.

Y 186 241

There are certain groups in Iraq, neither Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, the Yezidis or "devil-worshippers" of Jebel Sinjar and the Mandaeans of the southern provinces, who, as peaceful farmers and craftsmen, do not often come to the notice of the bulk of the population, and are regarded in the popular mind as curiosities more than anything else. The Yezidi girls are supposed to be "the most beautiful in the world," the same thing said by both Muslims and Christians in Lebanon and Syria of the Druze women. There is no intermarriage between the Muslims and these groups.

Y [142]

Y [582]

K 795 779 175

The second division is to be found among Muslims themselves, between those of the Sunna ("Custom") or orthodoxy, whose recognition of the legitimacy of the first four successors of the Prophet is perhaps the best known characteristic, and those of the Shi'ah ("party," from Shi'at 'Ali, "the party of 'Ali"), originally revolutionary, who insist on the primacy of the son-in-law of the Prophet and his descendants. The latter tradition has been the state religion of Iran from the time of the Safavid Shahs (1501-1736), and today includes, in one form, the peoples of Iran, Pakistan, and the agricultural population of southern Iraq. In central and northern

Iraq the Sunna is represented by most of the Arab groups, 795
the Kurds, the Turks, and the Turkomans. The conflict be- 779
tween the two, often with violent political expressions, is 175
much the same as that between Catholic and Protestant in [578]
Germany, although there is little analogy in the type of
religious content. The governing class in Iraq, deriving
from Ottoman times, is about half Sunnite, and the dis-
sension is often phrased along ethnic lines, Arab and Turk 795
against Arab and Persian. Certain practices, such as 186
staining the beard with henna, are condemned by the Kurds [302]
alternatively as Shiite or Iranian. Curiously, they
despise clitorectomy, in the Middle East purely Arabic and [304]
Negroid, as Farsi, "Persian," despite the fact that the
practice seems to have no record in that country. One
might suppose, particularly in view of the growth of pan-
Islamic movements in recent years, that this distinction
between Sunnite and Shiite was falling into decay. At a
gathering in Rowanduz the investigator, on being informed
by an army officer that he came from the southern provinces,
innocently inquired if he belonged to the Shi'ah. When the
officer replied seriously in the affirmative, there was a
burst of laughter and derision from his fellow officers and
officials, a matter of no little embarrassment. Save on [582]
the highest levels of society, there are few marriages be-
tween Sunnite and Shiite families.

The third division is on ethnic or national lines, 563
which, aside from foreigners and non-Muslims, separates

importance is attached to nursing, and the ultimate curse of a mother toward her offspring, the rarest of events, is the wish that her "milk should never have been a misfortune in his mouth." It is forbidden for children who have been nursed at the same breast to marry and for this reason a youth can never wed his foster-sister, the daughter of his wet-nurse. It must be noted that in selecting a wet nurse, one with whose daughter an advantageous marriage might be subsequently arranged is never sought, but rather some woman of the lower classes or of the villages. Neither of these explanations, nor a third, that of descent through "blood," can be expanded to explain the prohibition of marriage between two generations. To amplify this statement, one cannot marry his sister "because they have been nursed at the same breast," but the rationale does not apply to an aunt who is similarly forbidden.

Islamic law permits a man to take four wives if he so chooses. This, however, in its full realization presents many more obstacles than are immediately apparent. First, he must pay separate dowries for each spouse, and the dowry, as has been seen, as well as the feeding, clothing, and maintenance, of a single wife is not an inexpensive undertaking. Polygyny, then, is more often than not the prerogative of the extremely wealthy. At the same time, the threat to connubial happiness in maintaining two or more wives under the same roof is widely recognized in the Middle East, and there are many examples, in literature and in popular speech, of the intense jealousy developed in such a situation

a situation. The tendency is for most persons to remain 595
monogamous, and the usual reason for taking a second mate
is the failure of the first to produce a male heir when, [842]
at the same time, the husband is loathe to divorce the
barren woman in question. Ra'uf Effendi was "thinking" of
marrying a second wife who could replace the son he had
lost, because the woman to whom he had been married for
many years had passed the stage of child-bearing. He has
not, however, carried out this intention yet. Sometimes a
wife herself will suggest suggest the second marriage. In
Rowanduz, in 1951, there were no men with a plurality of
brides. It was said that some of the chieftains in older
times had been able to maintain a number of wives in
separate establishments, but most of this seems to have
disappeared.

The preferred form of marriage is that between a 582
man and his father's brother's daughter. If the father
and the uncle live under the same roof, it can be seen that
such a match prevents the dowry from being paid into a
strange pal, and in marriages of this type the stipulated
sum of the dowry is often highly fictional. In Kurdistan
a man always has the first claim on his paternal uncle's
daughter, and his consent must first be obtained if she
is to marry someone else. A bitter feud can ensue if the [578]
parents of the maiden, in view of some advantageous alliance,
override this prerogative. If an idealized situation is
imagined in which the prescription that a man must marry

wife, while taking advantage of labor which will no longer be available when the girl is married. Very few toys, including dolls, are to be found in the town, and the girls characteristically amuse themselves with an infant brother or sister as they might a plaything. Sexual education begins early in life, and does not seem to constitute a disturbing factor until adolescence. There is no standard parental formula for masturbation, and it was said that "some parents beat their children for this, and others advise them." It might also be noted that obscene language is freely permitted in most Kurdish households, except in the presence of the older males. One, for example, heard a mother call her daughter a "prostitute," and a little girl, who could scarcely appreciate the meaning of the word, addressed her sister in the same fashion.

In adolescence the thoughts of the children of the townspeople are turned to more serious matters, those of the youths toward a career and those of the girls toward marriage. The boys of the lower classes are gradually introduced to the trades of their fathers, helping them in the shops, and the girls must account for many of the domestic tasks. The sons of the wealthier townspeople are occupied the greater part of the year with their education, while aristocratic youths usually ignore both school and labor, following their fathers and older brothers. The daughters of a number of wealthy families in Rowanduz

3: Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

the Jaf confederacy of nomadic as well as sedentary tiras. The following discussion will, for the sake of simplicity, relate only to the Hamawands, an independent tira of population ca. 1000-1500, which became sedentary some two or three generations ago.

The lineage organization has two main areas of relevance: land ownership, and defence and offence in war. Property rights to land and grazing area are held jointly by the tira as a whole; exclusive usufruct rights are vested in its localized segments, inhabiting compact villages with a population of 50 to 200 individuals. Within the village territory, men have traditional rights to certain fields. These rights are passed on from father to son, but are not inalienable, and land is freely redistributed by the village council when the need arises. If a segment becomes extinct, its territory passes as normal inheritance to the other segments of the lineage, according to the degrees of kinship (on any one level of segmentation, "brothers" exclude "cousins" from inheritance).

Further, until successful pacification in 1932, the lineage was, and still is potentially, also a military unit, mobilized in toto if a segment were attacked from without, and divided in opposition according to the segmentary charter when conflicts arose within the group. Conflicts relating to territorial rights were rife, both within, where they led to fission, and without, where they led to conquest or loss of territory.

There is a clear contrast between the Kurdish and most African systems in the readiness with which the problems of fission and fusion are solved. A man's rights to land are limited to the territory of the village segment of his lineage; a stranger or a person from another lineage segment is accepted into a village only as hired farm help ("sapani") of degraded status. The territorial exclusiveness of lineage segments thus tends to be maintained to high degree, and there are no kinship mechanisms for developing "attached" lineages with local territorial and political rights.[7] The segmentary nature of the maximal lineage expresses itself directly in geographical distribution, and the respective territories of major and minor segments, inhabited nearly exclusively by them, down to the village level, can be plotted on a map or clearly seen where one has a view of the valley bottom. The main integrative factors relevant to segments larger than the village seem to be territorial contiguity, knowledge of common descent, and the importance of the tira as a defensive unit—this last probably being of most weight. No religious or ritual

7 A permanent relationship may occasionally be established between a conquering lineage group and a conquered, non-tribal peasant population, who retain certain rights as serfs of the ruling lineage. In these cases, a caste barrier is set up, preventing intermarriage between the two groups. This relationship, observed on the northern margins of Hamawand territory, does not seem to be very stable.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

621 roaching review of their case in the Land Settlement Comission[1]), when claims and counter-claims would come to a head, it was impossible to obtain detailed census material.

The village in question was conquered some 40 years ago by a segment of the Rashawand Hamawands, and lies at present on the very edge of Hamawand territory. Villages to the north of it, formerly under Hamawand control, have lately torn themselves lose.

The total population is ca. 100 individuals; of them, 5—6 households are Hamawand, 15—20 households *Meskjin*, subjected tenants, and there are a few families of laborers. The Hamawand faction is led by an *Agha;* the *Meskjin* are led by the *kikha* (official headman of the village). The latter is descended from the former headman, and was elected by the majority of the villagers, so in the face of government approval, the Hamawands had to accept him. Between these factions there has been no intermarriage.

The conflict in this village is related to that in the neighboring village, to which, according to the *Meskjin* version, the Hamawands wish to extend their privileges. The balance of power between the two factions seems at present to be quite labile. The *Meskjin* have been gaining ground through a slowly rising standard of living whereby rifles and ammunition have become increasingly available to them, and through the growing mediating effects of external administration. To fully understand the present tensions, one rule of the Land Settlement Comission which is to review ownership claims shortly should be noted: Where conflicting claims are advanced, any party who has for the last 10 years regularly collected tax on the land is regarded as the de-facto owner. It is thus vital for the Hamawands to retain their power, and for the *Meskjin* to break that power, before the Land Settlement Comission arrives on the spot.

• 578 To this end, the factions are mobilizing all available mechanisms.

[1]) The Land Settlement Comission, established during the British mandatory period, is a court of claims relating to questions of land tenure. Coordinated with a comprehensive program of mapping, its object is systematically to cover all agricultural land, and definitively settle and register proprietory rights (cf. Dowson 1931).

Unless a certain sum of money is paid, all young male citizens of Iraq are liable to two years of military training and service. This is much resented by most villagers, and they attempt to avoid being called up. According to the *Meskjin*, the Hamawands have an arrangement with the police whereby they give the names of all *Meskjin* men in the two village who are liable for such service, in return for being left in peace themselves. Thus, it is said, the fighting strength of the *Meskjin* is constantly kept down.

The *Meskjin*, on the other hand, are accused of manipulating the religious brotherhood of Derwishes for political purpose, so as to organize all the *Meskjin* of the neighboring villages in a movement of resistance. To counteract this influence, the Hamawand *Agha* is at pains to expose the derwishes as fraudulent, and attempts to enhace the position of the local mullah, the recognized leader of the local mosque. — The final verdict, however, rests with the Land Settlement Comission, an institution the integrity of which few persons choose to question.

The rigidity of the Kurdish tribal system is here clearly illustrated, and might profitably be contrasted to that of the Nuer, as described by Evans-Pritchard (1940). The Nuer have, in spite of extensive conquests and various vicissitudes, retained a system of patrilineal *exo*gamous lineages as the basis of their political organization. These lineages however are *not* corporate localized groups, but are conceptually identified with certain areas, where they tend to form the organizing core of the local villages. Through a system of adoption of conquered Dinka tribesmen to specific lineages, and by reckoning descent through females, a larger community is built around this core, based on «sociological» kinship. Among the Kurds, on the other hand, the general practice of FaBrDa marriage and other close family endogamy makes any initial *rapprochement* impossible between conqueror and conquered, and encourages caste separation. Furthermore, kinship through female links is given no political recognition. The principle of «sociological» kinship is unfamiliar and would be in conflict with Islamic doctrine — the kinship terminology describes actual, genealogical distance, and practices of adoption into lineages would be unacceptable. The only way two groups could fuse in the

probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have corrupted the morals of the youth. 609

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil. 758

The Government have made various experiments in agricultural reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred. 695 249

The independent judiciary functions through its court in Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate) before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules governing "appeal" of this sort, nor as to the limits of sentence that can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at Erbil. 635 692

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil and Rowandus. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the "barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted. 635 701 578

The liwa is divided into several districts (khasa) each presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1 with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the khasa of Rowandus. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his liwa. 635

The khasa in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts (nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case coinciding with the tribal one. Dergala on the other hand is administered from Rowandus.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

Where possible the driving water is obtained by diverting some main stream. This is done at Naupurdan, Rayat and Nerga and the operation of the mill then has no effect upon the irrigation system of the village. In Dergala however water supplies are less adequate. If the stream is diverted through the irrigation channels there is insufficient to drive the mill. A compromise has therefore been reached. The water is passed through the cultivation on average six hours per day and to the mill for the remaining eighteen. Some friction arises on this account and while I was in Dergala a young man got a good kicking from the Agha for cutting the dyke during the night so as to get an extra supply of water for his tobacco seedlings. Here again then is an obstacle that might prove confusing to any hastily thought out scheme of agricultural reform.

The owner of the mill is probably in most cases a near relative of the Agha. In Naupurdan it is the Agha himself, in Dergala a father-in-law of the Agha. The terms are in effect that the owner of the wheat hires the mill at a fixed charge for each sack of corn ground. The man who owns the wheat himself operates the machinery. There is no suggestion of selling the corn to the miller. The millowner merely obtains a rental for the use of his apparatus. In this he is in competition with up-to-date apparatus in the towns, the latter being of course much quicker and producing a smoother and cleaner flour. In general however the trouble involved in carrying the wheat to Rowandus and bringing the flour back again is sufficient to ensure that the business remains with the local mill provided the price charged is not too high. In outlying districts at any rate then the mill seems likely to remain a permanent institution.

Weaving

*The only other piece of technical equipment I intend to discuss in this study is the cloth loom. The design of the apparatus is indicated in the diagram. It is nearly identical to the loom used elsewhere in Iraq, with the difference that the latter has the "beater in" suspended from a rigid rectangular framework instead of freely hung from the roof as in the Kurdish example. This improvement permits the widening of the warp. Thus while the Kurdish loom has a maximum warp of about 10½ inches, an apparatus which I saw in Baghdad could carry a warp nearly three times as wide. Kurdish weavers do not apparently ever attempt complicated patterns, they always use a plain weave. Stripes are sometimes introduced by means of coloured threads in the warp. Qualities of cloth produced differ mainly in the thickness and density of the threads. Thus from specimens in my possession, the coarse brown cloth, normally used for the trouserings of commoners, has Warp 19; Weft 22 threads

*The rug loom is quite a different piece of apparatus; it is not considered here since its social relevance seems insignificant.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

CHAPTER 5

Warfare

Under present conditions large scale warlike activities on the part of the tribes are a complete impossibility, but that does not justify us in dismissing the topic of warfare altogether as being of no relevance to the present social situation. Historically speaking the traditional forms of Kurdish social organisation are associated with an ideology of raids and counter raids, war, pillage and feud. Earlier writers have undoubtedly greatly exaggerated the extent to which the average Kurd in former times did in fact devote himself to murder, violence and loot, but in describing this preoccupation they were, after all, only accepting the Kurd at his own valuation. The Kurdish ideal of manly behaviour does correspond very closely with the typical English concept of a "Brigand". His folk tales are gory in the extreme; his conversation hardly less so. And this has relevance to the existing situation. The Agha likes to think of himself as a military leader rather than as a landlord; he habitually classes all his neighbours into 'friends' and 'enemies'. The consequences of this attitude are highly subtle and cannot be examined here, but at least two divergent trends can be noted. On the one hand the sharp antagonism between neighbouring groups is even today a force of social cohesion; the members of the clan or the tribe are aware of their unity largely in terms of their common enmity to some other group. On the other hand increasing economic contacts and the constant harmonising efforts of the Police and the Administration, in so far as they are successful in lessening intergroup suspicion, do at the same time serve to lessen the social cohesion of the groups concerned.

While organised raiding or warfare is now impossible the private feud continues and may be examined further.

The Feud

The motif of the blood feud may be summarised by the phrase that "a man's wrongs must be avenged by his kinsfolk and his descendants", and we may note at once that a system of small patrilocal, nearly endogamous groups is peculiarly suited to perpetuate antagonisms of this kind. The individual's near kinfolk are also his near neighbours, and since his wife's kinsfolk are probably identical with his own he is bound by no ties of loyalty to any group outside his own village. Within the village all are bound together to resist the aggressor, beyond it everyone is a potential enemy, the identity of interest between the family and the village is complete.

Quarrels between villages may arise from a variety of causes, chiefly economic. Water and grazing rights are always ill-defined and may lead to serious friction in times of scarcity, and this may

578 lead to one side burning the other's crops or stealing their cattle.
628 Until bloodshed has occurred nothing is serious and a good clan Agha will
684 see to it that the parties submit to arbitration before the affair
681 reaches a crisis. More serious are affairs in which women are involved; an insult to honour can only be wiped out by death and the discovery of adultery can have only one possible sequel. Such cases however need not necessarily lead to feud; if the guilty lover belongs to the same village as the injured husband a single murder is considered to settle the matter. If the parties are from different groups however the affair is much more serious and several assassinations may take place before settlement can be reached. Eventually, provided it is the honour of commoners rather than of Aghas that is at stake, the Aghas concerned will arrange peace through the mediation of the tribal chiefs. According to Hay "a blood feud is usually settled by the payment of blood-money; every condition of man or woman has his or her price, and even the parts of the body are catalogued. A Kurmanji or middle class Kurdish farmer is valued at £90, one of his women at £45, and his leg or arm at say £20. Such payment is often made in kind, some cattle or a horse, or so much wheat being handed over to the aggrieved party. It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in payment of blood money. Thus if £90 were owing, the price of the blood of one man the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three cows and a donkey". I have no comparable information, though I think the general principle is accurately described. In Hay's time the Government could seldom apprehend a murderer. He says "For the murdered man's relations to take their revenge is quite in order, but an execution at the hands of that monster, the Government, is an entirely different matter. The culprit therefore is carefully concealed until he can make good his escape to the hills". The position today is somewhat different and I fancy the murderer is usually caught. This however does not end the feud; blood feud murders are punishable only by two years imprisonment and the war starts again when the culprit gets free.

628 As has been explained the feuds of commoners and the less important Aghas are settled in the end by tribal arbitration. Moreover

* The Administration makes a distinction between feud murders
628 justified by tribal custom and ordinary murders which are not. The
684 former come under a special code for which the maximum penalty is two
178 years imprisonment; the latter come under the ordinary Iraq criminal code for which the penalty is much more severe (? death). This has had an interesting repercussion. In the old days by tribal custom an affair of honour was adequately settled if the man only was killed, the woman in the case being merely driven out of her own community to fend for herself. Today it is necessary for the avenging husband to prove to the Authorities that it is really an affair of honour and not just a cold blooded murder. The custom now therefore is to kill both the guilty parties.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

nowadays the Government takes an active interest in the proceedings and by threat of dire and awful penalties is usually able to settle the affair near the start. Much more serious is a feud in which important tribal leaders are involved; here settlement is extremely difficult and assassinations may apparently continue for generations. One such major feud splits the Rowandus district at the present time and has become so widespread that the contestants have assumed the scale and significance of political parties. Practically everyone I met seemed to be involved on one side or the other, some as active assassins, others, the majority, merely as intriguers. The term "my enemies" was clearly highly elastic; - as far as I could judge there was no particular distinction between mere political opponents and those one was prepared to assassinate. The allagiance of the more remote contestants is doubtless largely determined by kinship considerations, but *this is not always obvious*. A nephew of Hamid Amin of Dergala who had been shot in the back a year before was quite closely related to both of the principal contestant families; and there seemed to be no obvious reason why he should be campaigning on one side rather than the other.

Moreover 578 628 668

When this particular feud started is not clear, but it was already well established in 1918 and Hay mentions it a number of times; the most recent murder of the sequence occurred the day after I left Rowandus. The murderer had come out of prison three days before, having been gaoled two years previously on account of an earlier assassination. My records on the subject are certainly very incomplete but even so they show a considerable casualty record:-

Descendants and Relatives of Bawil Agha - 5 dead, 2 wounded, 2 in prison.

Descendants and Relatives of Abdulla Pasha - 4 dead.

Today the affair has become entangled with all sorts of wider issues - Kurdish Nationalism in particular. Accusations of being pro-British, or pro-Arab, or anti-Kurd were levelled at all and sundry, and in the limited time available I had no chance to unravel all the complex of personal antagonisms and rival interests involved. Iraqi-Kurdistan however is now a part of Iraq and it was highly interesting to see how in this new political situation the old antagonisms were being re-aligned to cope with wider issues on a more impersonal front.

Religious Organisation

Religion is not a subject that the investigator can gain much information on in his first preliminary survey, and my own studies in this field were particularly slender.

*Cf. the feud between the Husseinis and the Nahashibis in Palestine today.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

177 668 they did once, in 1942, invite the leading aghas to Baku. In the spring of that year, when the Kurds raided some villages west of Lake Urmieh, the Soviets even brought back the Iranian army and gendarmerie (though they rendered their possible services ineffective by constant interference). Yet the Soviets eventually realized the potentialities of the situation. The year 1944 saw Azerbaijan and Kurdistan filled with Soviet political officers and other agents, mostly Moslems from Soviet Azerbaijan. The work in Kurdistan centered around the Soviet Consulate in Rezaieh, attached to which was at least one of the Soviet Union's 100,000 Kurds, known as "Captain Jafarov," who wandered freely among the tribesmen and villagers in Kurdish dress.

Soviet activity in Mahabad dates from the time two of these agents, known as "Abdullahov" and "Hajiov," appeared, ostensibly to buy horses for the Red Army. Apparently a chance encounter first brought them into contact with the Kurdish nationalist movement. The story is that Abdullahov met a man [578] dressed in Kurdish costume in an Armenian wine-shop in Mahabad and complimented him on wearing the national dress.[1] This attention aroused the interest of the Kurd, who happened to be one of the founders of the Komala. They fell into conversation, and finally the Kurd asked whether the Soviets would furnish arms if the Kurds were to form a nationalist party. Abdullahov parried with the question, "Who are you afraid of?" The Kurd said that they feared only their own khans. Abdullahov replied with an expression of contempt for the khans; the Kurd then brought him to a private home where he introduced him to the other leaders of the Komala. Further contacts with Soviet authorities were arranged and one of the Komala leaders who knew Russian became the party's liaison officer. From that time, although the party program called for appeals to each of the Big

[1] Kurdish dress consists of a tasseled turban of blue silk, embroidered vest, baggy grey pants of homespun wool, and a huge crimson kammerband, intricately knotted in front, from which protrudes a pipe, the top of a tobacco pouch, and a long, curved dagger. The Kurds, like other Iranians forced to abandon their native dress by Reza Shah, kept their clothes hidden in their homes, a symbol of their national pride, until the Allied invasion, when they suddenly blossomed out in them. Indeed, the tribesmen, safe in their mountains, had never really abandoned them. The Kurds are incorrigible dandies and a poor man among them would rather spend his last coins on a fine sash than on a good *kabab*. Reza Shah's restrictions on their dress had served to make him and his regime all the more hated.

291 186 556 578

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

668 642 The fall of Tabriz was the cue for Qazi Mohammad to declare his own area independent — which it had long been in fact. On December 15 at a meeting in Mahabad attended by tribal chiefs, the leaders of the new Kurdish Democrat Party, Mulla Mustafa, and three Soviet officers in a jeep and armed with tommy-guns, he solemnly inaugurated the Kurdish People's Government and raised the Kurdish flag. A national parliament of thirteen members was formed, and on January 22, 1946, Qazi Mohammad was elected president of the new republic. The Minister of War was his cousin, Mohammad Hosein Khan Seif Qazi, a merchant whose military reputation rested on his honorary rank of captain in the Iranian gendarmerie. Seif Qazi, Mulla Mustafa, Amr Khan Shikak, Hama Rashid Khan Banei (just returned from Iraq with his tribesmen), and Zero Beg Herki[1] received the rank of "marshal," and were provided with Soviet uniforms, complete with high boots, stiff shoulder-straps, and red-banded garrison caps.[2]

578 668 The new government, which controlled only a minute territory including the towns of Mahabad, Bokan, Naqadeh, and Ushnuieh, sent observers to the opening of the Azerbaijan National Parliament and even convoked a miniature parliament of its own. It also dispatched Mulla Mustafa south to fight the Iranian garrisons in Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardasht, cut off from each other and their base in Senandaj by the heavy winter snows.

RELATIONS WITH TABRIZ AND TEHRAN

Meanwhile in the north the capture of Rezaieh by the Azerbaijani Democrats brought new problems to the Kurdish government. Although the majority of the inhabitants of the plains west

177 622 624 645 [1] Zero Beg was a bandit chief originally associated with the famous Shikak rebel chief, Simitku. Upon the latter's defeat and murder by Reza Shah, Zero Beg fled to Iraq, returning in 1941 to carve out a domain for himself in the Barandust Valley. He was often seen with Soviet political officers and seems to have been their favored protégé. Although of little importance in his own tribe, the Herki, most of whom still followed their hereditary chiefs, these Soviet connections enabled him to play an important role in developments in Kurdistan.

[2] Other officials of the new government were Hajji Baba Sheikh, local religious leader, Prime Minister; Sadiq Haideri, Minister of Works and Propaganda; Nasaf Karimi, Minister of Education; Mohammad Amin Mu'ini, Minister of Commerce; Ahmad Ilahi, Minister of the Treasury; Seyyid Mohammad Tahazadeh, Minister of Health; and Khalil Khosrovi, Minister of the Interior. Only one of these men had been among the founders of the Komala, but all belonged to the middle or upper classes — small merchants, officials, landlords.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

177 of Lake Urmieh, from Rezaieh north to Maku, are Azerbaijani Turks, the tribes of the hills commanding the plains are Kurds. 578 The Miandoab area, southeast of the lake, also has a mixed population. These areas were claimed by both the Tabriz and the Mahabad governments and were a source of constant friction. Amr Khan and the tribes paid little attention to the Azerbaijani Democrats, and were continually encroaching on the villages and towns presumably under the control of Tabriz. In April 1946, the Soviets brought Qazi Mohammad to Tabriz in an attempt to settle the differences between the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds. It was essential at that time that the two puppet states form a united front, as negotiations were about to open between the Democrats and the Iranian Government for a permanent settlement of the status of the province.

668 The final result of talks between Pishevari, leader of the Azerbaijani Democrats, Qazi Mohammad, and the Soviets was a treaty signed April 23, 1946, by the Kurdish and the Azerbaijani representatives. Publication of this treaty caused consternation in Tehran, as its clauses and indeed its very existence showed that the twin Democrat regimes considered themselves independent nations with the right to exchange representatives and make treaties. The text of the treaty was as follows:

1. The two signatory governments will exchange representatives whenever it is deemed advisable.
2. In those areas of Azerbaijan where there are Kurdish minorities, Kurds will be appointed to government departments, and in those parts of Kurdistan where there are Azerbaijani minorities, Azerbaijanis will be appointed to government departments.
3. A joint economic commission will be formed to solve the economic problems of the signatory nations. Members of this commission will be appointed by the heads of the national governments.
4. The military forces of the signatory nations will assist each other whenever necessary.
5. Any negotiations with the Tehran Government will be conducted in the joint interest of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish national governments.
6. The Azerbaijan National Government will take the necessary steps to promote the use of the Kurdish language and the development of Kurdish culture among the Kurds of Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish National Government will take similar steps with regard to the Azerbaijanis living in Kurdistan.
7. Both signatory nations will take measures to punish any individual or

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

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641 considered to be characteristic of the central Iranian Government.

OPPOSITION OF THE TRIBES

249 If the Soviets kept their overt interference to a minimum in
578 order to reconcile the tribes to the regime, they were certainly unsuccessful. In addition to historical, social, and religious reasons
668 for the tribes' opposition to the Soviet-supported government,
177 there were strong economic ones. The Kurdish tribesmen depended largely on their tobacco crop for their livelihood, and now that their market in the rest of Iran was cut off they suffered considerable hardship. In certain areas food supplies already strained had to be shared with the destitute Barzanis, who had long outworn their welcome.

This tribal discontent was at its strongest in the south where the deceased Qaranei Agha's son, Mam Aziz, chief of the Mamesh, along with his ally, Bayazid Agha of the Mangur, so openly opposed Qazi Mohammad that the Soviet vice-consul finally came down from Rezaieh and threatened to have the Barzanis sent against them. When Mam Aziz continued to resist, the Barzanis did indeed attack him and he was forced to flee to Iraq with some of his tribesmen. From Rezaieh north, the tribes looked to the leadership of Amr Khan Shikak, who had resigned from his position in Qazi's government as minister of war and for the time being was keeping aloof in Zindasht, his mountain capital southwest of Shahpur. The only tribes Qazi Mohammad could count on were the Gawrik of Mahabad, numbering less than a thousand armed men, and part of the small tribe of Zerza, in the Ushnuieh region. Even Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis did not get on with Qazi Mohammad, who was no longer able to feed them.

668 Thus it was that Qazi Mohammad, in the face of the increasingly aggressive attitude of the Tehran Government, found himself almost without support. Despite Soviet promises of aid and matériel, in the fall of 1946 Qazi Mohammad was still without either heavy weapons or trained men, or indeed any effective army at all. As Iranian preparations became increasingly obvious, Qazi sent frantic messages to the tribes, his only hope, say-